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Introduction
A presumption in the law enforcement literature is that potential o¤enders
are more responsive to increases in the certainty than increases in the severity
of punishment. This presumption dates back at least 250 years to Beccarias
inuential work,1 and appears to be endorsed by scholars of law as well as eco-
nomics. An important implication of this presumption within the Beckerian
law enforcement model is that criminals are risk-seeking. Because risk-aversion
is assumed in many analyses of economic decision making, this implication ap-
pears to be problematic. A number of articles have identied conditions under
which this presumption and risk-aversion can coexist by stepping outside the
simple Beckerian framework.2 This note adds to this literature by showing that
o¤enders who discount future monetary benets can be more responsive to the
certainty rather than the severity of punishment, even when they are risk averse,
and even when their disutility from imprisonment rises proportionally (or more
than proportionally) with the length of the sentence.3
Specically, we consider cases where the criminal may have to delay the en-
joyment of the gains from his crimes until after he serves his sentence. A classic
example is a thief who buries his loot before being caught by law enforcers, and
digs it out after serving his sentence. If the criminal discounts future monetary
gains, increases in the probability and severity of punishment have asymmetric
e¤ects on his expected utility. While an increase in the probability of pun-
ishment increases the odds that the criminal will have to delay consumption,
an increase in the severity of the sanction only further increases the amount
by which the criminal will have to discount future gains. The former e¤ect is
greater than the latter, because discounting occurs at a diminishing rate.
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1See ch 27. in Beccaria and Voltaire (1953). Dei delitti e delle pene, the original work by
Cesare Beccaria was published in 1764.
2See, e.g., Brown and Reynolds (1973), Polinsky and Shavell (1999), Neilson and Winter
(1997), Block and Lind (1995), Pyne (2012), and Mungan and Klick (2014).
3Block and Lind (1975) and Polinsky and Shavell (1999), reviewed below, supply similar
rationales when disutility from imprisonment rises less than proportionally.
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These observations are most closely related to Block and Lind (1975) and
Polinsky and Shavell (1999). Block and Lind (1975) considers criminals who
are risk averse in wealth but "risk takers in sentences" (Block and Lind (1975,
p. 481)). The latter assumption is equivalent to the case where "the disutility
of imprisonment rises less than proportionally with the sentence" as in Polin-
sky and Shavell (1999).4 Both studies demonstrate that risk seeking behavior
over sentences provides a rationale as to why criminals respond more to the
certainty, rather than the severity, of punishment. In this note, we focus on
the observation that even if criminalsdisutility from imprisonment does not
rise less than proportionally due to direct e¤ects of imprisonment (e.g. loss of
liberty),5 the indirect e¤ect of imprisonment on criminalsenjoyment of wealth
can cause criminals to be more responsive to increases in the probability rather
than the severity of punishment. Next, we formalize this observation with a
simple modication of the Beckerian model of law enforcement.
Model and Analysis
The potential o¤enders utility is assumed to be a function of his criminal
gains and s, the sentence he expects to serve if convicted for his criminal act.6 It
is assumed that the criminal will have to delay the consumption of his monetary
gain from crime until he serves his sentence. The value of consumption of
criminal gains is allowed to depend on s, because the criminal may discount
future consumption relative to present consumption. To simplify the analysis
it is further assumed that the disutility from punishment and the utility from
future criminal gains are additively separable.7 These assumptions are captured
by the utility function V (s;m) = su(m) y(s) where u denotes the utility from
monetary criminal gains (m),  is the o¤enders discount rate, and y(s) denotes
the disutility from serving a sentence of s. The probability of conviction is p.
Given this notation, and setting u(0) = y(0) = 0, a potential o¤ender commits
crime if:
p(su(m)  y(s)) + (1  p)(u(m)) > 0 (1)
This decision making criterion implies the following proposition:
Proposition: Potential o¤enders are more responsive to increases in the
probability rather than the severity of punishment when the direct disutility from
punishment does not rise more than proportionally with the length of the sen-
tence. Furthermore, this result does not depend on the o¤enders risk attitude
over monetary gains.
Proof: The responsiveness of an o¤ender with respect to increases in the
4See Polinsky and Shavell (1999 p. 3) and Block and Lind (1975 p. 481) listing reasons
for why disutility may rise less than proportionally
5See Polinsky and Shavell (1999 p. 3) discussing why criminalsdisutility from imprison-
ment may not rise less than proportionally.
6To simplify the analysis we assume that the sanction does not have a monetary component.
7This assumption is not necessary. In particular, a more general utility function of the
form U(i(s);m(s)) with Ui < 0 and Um > 0, where i is the identity function, implies the
same results.
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probability and severity of punishment are respectively given by
Ep =  
dV
dp
p
V
= [y(s) + (1  s)u(m)] p
V
(2)
and
Es =  
dV
ds
s
V
= [y0(s)  ln()su(m)]ps
V
(3)
Hence, Ep > Es i¤
[y(s)  sy0(s)] >  u(m)[(1  s) + s ln()s] (4)
The left hand side of (4) is non-negative when y00  0. Next, let f(s) = (1 s),
then f 0(s) =  [ln()s], and f 00(s) =  [ln()2s] < 0. Hence, f(s) = (1  s) >
 s ln()s = sf 0(s), due to the concavity of f . Accordingly, the right hand side
of (4) is always negative, and therefore the inequality in (4) holds regardless of
the shape of u.
The proof of this proposition also reveals a simple corollary, namely that a
potential o¤ender can be more responsive to increases in the probability rather
than the severity of punishment even when his direct disuitlity from impris-
onment rises more than proportionally with the length of the sentence. This
follows, because for any negative value on the right hand side of inequality
(4) one can nd a slightly convex y that would make the left hand side of (4)
negative but still greater than the right hand side of (4).
Conclusion
A number of articles in the law enforcement literature have identied ra-
tionales as to how criminals may respond more to increases in the probability
rather than the severity of punishment, and yet be risk-averse with regard to
monetary outcomes. This note provides a simple addition to the rationales pre-
viously identied. It shows that when criminals discount future enjoyment of
wealth they can be more responsive to increases in the certainty than the sever-
ity of punishment. Moreover, it shows that this rationale is independent of the
shape of criminalsdirect disutility from imprisonment, and thereby broadens
the conditions under which such rationales exist.
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